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Abstract 
This paper aims to give a new perspective on the issue 
of sovereignty in the European context. In this context, 
we argue that the EU can contribute to increase 
Member States sovereignty. Many academic circles 
have advocated that the EU limits State’s sovereignty. 
This is why we intend to present a new approach to 
sovereignty in the European context. 
In order to present our argument we will discuss and 
debate the concept of sovereignty, both in the internal 
and external dimensions, which are associated with the 
concept of power. Then we will check if European 
states have the necessary means that enables them to 
project their power. We’ll also argue that there are real 
limitations, in current capabilities, and in resources 
availability needed to develop them in the future. We’ll 
also present the concept of politics of scale, arguing 
that we can apply this concept to develop state’s 
capabilities, which allow the necessary power 
projection, which enhances state’s sovereignty. 
This found that pooling and sharing will increase EU 
member states sovereignty, since it will allow a greater 
ability to project power, which is essential to support 
the external dimension of sovereignty. Thus, through a 
process of sharing and pooling member states will have 
the ability to defend their interests on a global scale, a 
level of intervention that will be denied if they choose 
to pursue individually. We also conclude that the 
current economic crisis may be used has a catalyst to 
deepen these mechanisms. 
Introduction 
This paper addresses the dimensions of sovereignty in 
the European context. We argue that the European 
Union (EU) contributes to increase the sovereignty of 
its Member States.  
In the literature there is the general idea that the EU 
restricts Member State (MS) sovereignty. In general, 
the argument presented is that the transfer of slices of 
state’s sovereignty to a supranational structure limits 
MS freedom, thus limiting it’s sovereignty. In this 
argument, sovereignty is linked to the concept of 
freedom of decision, which - in our point of view - 
suffers from two flaws of reasoning, (i) associate the 
concept of sovereignty to the concept of freedom of 
decision, and (ii) bypass the decision making process 
within the EU, not addressing the role of each MS in 
this decision process. 
In order to present our argument we have conceived a 
multidimensional concept of sovereignty, using the 
tools provided by Collier, Laporte & Seawright [1]. We 
divided the concept of sovereignty in its multiple 
dimensions – both internal and external – and we 
focused our attention on the external dimension. Then, 
we assigned indicators to the dimensions, and observed 
the result. In order to measure our dimensions we used 
the tool provided by Goertz [2]. For proving the 
cause-effect that will lead us to conclusions, we 
followed the framework provided by Castro [3]. 
In the first chapter we will discuss the concept of 
sovereignty, analysing it in its internal and external 
dimensions. In fact, it is the existence of an external 
dimension – the pillar of independence - that gives 
meaning to sovereignty. Therefore we will focus on 
independence, and will associate it with notion of 
power, addressing the ways that a state can present and 
project its power in the international society. 
Having presented the concept, in chapter two we will 
investigate if the European states have the means to 
project this power. One may also argue that European 
states do not have the full range of capabilities because 
there is no threat, and if it existed, they would have the 
necessary resources to develop the capabilities. 
However, in this chapter, we will conclude that there 
are serious limitations in the EU MS genetic strategy, 
relating to the availability of resources needed to 
develop capabilities in the future. 
In the third chapter we will discuss the concept of 
politics of scale, and present - according to this 
concept – what Member States are currently doing 
regarding the development of capabilities that will 
allow the projection of power. Finally, and in the last 
chapter, we intend to present some conclusions.  
 
The Concept of Sovereignty 
We begin this paper with an approach to the concept of 
sovereignty, according to Jean Bodin. Sovereignty can 
be defined as the “supreme, absolute and perpetual 
power over citizens and subjects” [4, p. 1]. For Bodin, 
the essential function of the sovereign was the 
legislative capacity, which was applicable to the 
subjects, but not to the sovereign. According to Bodin, 
the word "Law" in Latin implies the command of who 
holds the sovereignty [4, p. 11]. Thus, the ability to 
enforce the law, even without the consent of the 
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subjects, is the ultimate goal of sovereignty [4, p. 23]. 
In Bodin’s vision, sovereignty was only linked to 
independence indirectly. If the sovereign had no limits 
to impose the law, there was no superior in the internal 
dimension. But could that be the case if the sovereign 
was not independent? 
This concept was later to be clarified in its external 
dimension when the system of Westphalia recognized 
sovereignty as the supreme, absolute and perpetual 
power, in the internal dimension, which is immune to 
interference from the external dimension. The principle 
of exclusion of outside interference - negotiated in 
Westphalia – leads to the recognition of "other" outside 
entity. In fact, the concept of sovereignty in its external 
dimension would be meaningless if the sovereign entity 
was isolated. We can only conceive of the concept of 
sovereignty if we are facing an international society, 
and the supremacy and independence in the domestic 
order are the two sides of the same coin. Thus, we can 
divide sovereignty in two main dimensions, internal 
and external [5, p. 288-290]. 
In order to express the independence in the external 
dimension, the concept of sovereignty is closely linked 
to the concept of power. Therefore, the means and 
instruments available to effectively exercise 
sovereignty define the power of a State. However, the 
concept of “power” is not absolute, like the external 
dimension of sovereignty, but relative to another entity. 
For this reason, the state needs a set of means available, 
which will enable the exercise of power both in the 
domestic side - which is supreme - as the external 
dimension, reinforcing the independence. Sovereignty 
requires power to act and, thus, to enforce sovereignty, 
both in internal and external dimensions, and without it, 
the concept no longer makes sense [6, p. 14-15]. 
Sovereignty also has physical limits. The supreme 
power over citizens is limited by the boundaries of the 
state. This supremacy in the internal dimension is only 
valid - by definition - within the limits of a territory. 
Thus, defining territorial boundaries assumes a capital 
importance for understanding the very concept of 
sovereignty. With a boundary we are dealing with a 
physical location criteria: being inside or outside a 
given territory, delimited by a boundary is what 
ultimately defines the scope of supreme power. This 
concept of physical boundary that limits and defines 
power, led states to define imaginary lines crossing 
mountains, rivers and plains, which later were called 
borders [7, p. 16-17]. This notion of border is both 
inclusive and exclusive, whether we are addressing the 
internal or external dimensions of sovereignty.  
The evolution of the concept led the international 
society to impose itself other limitations. In fact, 
sovereignty does not assume only a right but rather as a 
status - to be sovereign - which uses a set of legitimate 
rights, duties and powers [5, p. 297]. This idea of duties 
of the sovereign was already described in Hobbes, who 
argues that the sovereign state exists to ensure the 
security and defence of the Sovran’s freedom and 
dignity, and that for these functions the State is 
provided with authority and power. Thus, the sovereign 
has the sword of war to and sword of justice [8, p. 
93-103]. Based on this argument, Jackson argues that 
today there is also a duty to protect populations. For 
him, the "sword" of Hobbes has two edges, i.e., the 
right and duty to protect [6, p. 121]. 
Keeping this in mind, a question should be asked 
regarding the exercise of power by the State. We know 
that the state has a monopoly over military power and 
justice. However, what are the existing mechanisms for 
accountability for in the exercise of its power [6, p. 
18-19]? This debate is still inconclusive. However, one 
can argue that the (un)accountability of the state is 
what somehow legitimizes external intervention in 
internal affairs of the state, thus breaking the 
“supreme” power in the internal dimension. An 
example would be the so-called “Humanitarian 
Intervention”. In this argument, if a state does not 
adequately protect its populations, it would loose the 
right of non-interference in its internal affairs. 
For the sake of our argument, we will only stress that 
sovereignty, as supreme and independent power, only 
makes sense in an international context. Concurrently, 
the use of power needs instruments, which should be 
available to the state. Without the existence of 
instruments – providing the State with the ability to 
perform its right and duty to protect populations - the 
notion of sovereignty appears meaningless. Therefore, 
it is necessary to seek and develop tools that enable the 
state to effectively exercise its sovereignty.  
European State’s Capabilities 
On the previous chapter we have demonstrated that the 
concept of sovereignty is closely linked to the concept 
of power. Thus, the state must have necessary tools of 
power, in order to protect and safeguard its citizens. 
Particularly, regarding foreign action, the State holds - 
albeit nowadays limited - the "sword of war”. This is 
why in this chapter we will address EU MS current 
capabilities, and we will also verify their ability to 
acquire and maintain new ones.  
In an excellent analysis, Lindley-French and Franco 
Algieri debated - among others - the European 
capabilities. They identified the tasks that EU MS 
armed forces were not yet able to perform. A key 
component for this analysis is the capability of force 
projection. In the European setting, only 10% are 
deployable forces, and on these only about 50,000 to 
60,000 staff can be employed in peacekeeping 
operations or medium and high intensity operations. 
This lack of personnel is particularly apparent if we 
compare the ratios used in other counter-subversion 
theatres. The report points out that there was a ratio of 
10 British soldiers for every 1,000 inhabitants, in 
Northern Ireland at the highest intensity conflict date. 
Transferring this ratio - without affecting it of the 
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social factors such as cultural proximity, language, the 
existing infrastructure in Northern Ireland and the 
issues related to the standard of living - to Iraq, we 
found that we would need 250,000 men and that the 
ratio in Afghanistan is about 0.2 per 1,000 inhabitants, 
which raises serious questions about the viability of the 
mission in both territories [9, p. 33]. 
This structural weakness of European forces appears 
more obvious if you analyse the level of conflict. 
Lindley-French and Franco Algieri present a model 
that quantifies the intensity of the conflict from 1 to 10, 
dividing it into four types of operations: Petersberg 
tasks with low intensity, Petersberg tasks with medium 
intensity; advanced expeditionary warfare, and the full 
scale warfare. According to this analysis, only the 
United States has the capability to engage across all 
spectrums of conflict, and within the European 
countries, only Britain and France can engage in an 
"advanced expeditionary warfare." Other EU MS can 
only aspire to Petersberg tasks of low and medium 
intensity [9, p. 28-35]. 
 
Picture 1 - Conflict Intensity Scale [9, p. 89].  
With this data we conclude that there is limited 
capacity of the EU MS Armed Forces to engage in 
external military intervention, something that is 
certainly not new. One can also see what is currently 
going on in other theatres, like Libya. However, one 
can argue that the EU MS have not developed their 
military apparatus as the result of the lack of direct 
threat, and that - should this exist – would have the 
ability to develop the military instrument. We do agree 
with the first argument - the absence of a direct threat - 
but we do not agree with the second. This is why we 
will check EU MS military development capabilities. 
We begin by analysing the population, and the greatest 
challenge for all EU MS is its ageing population. In the 
past years EU MS have observed a decrease in birth 
and death rate. The decreases of theses rates do not 
lead to a decrease in population, but leads to ageing. 
This ageing could partly be solved by an emigration 
increase, which would bring the issue of integrating 
new minorities. One can easily see the problems that i.e. 
Libyan and Tunisian emigration has brought to the 
relations between Italy and France. However, an ageing 
population has a direct impact in the available revenue 
distribution, with an inevitable increase in health bills 
and social security, increasing the already high public 
sector deficits. These deficits will lead - as one can 
observe today – to spending cuts, particularly in areas 
that do not provide immediate income, like the military. 
Simultaneously, aging will have an impact on 
recruitment by decreasing the available workforce. By 
doing so, the military will have to compete with other 
professions for labour, and will have to come up with 
better offerings, that will – in its own turn – lead to a 
spending increase… This scenario would be possible if 
we were having a big economic growth… In fact, we 
do not expect to be a double-digit growth, and therefore 
will reject such a scenario.  
To conclude, we observe that (i) EU MS have currently 
limited military intervention capabilities, and (ii) that 
European aging population will have an impact on the 
available resources, with a greater pressure on health 
spending and social security. If at the same time, there 
is no room for an economy growth, we are led to 
conclude that EU MS do not have the ability to develop 
- autonomously - the means of defence which will 
guarantee the application of force. This, therefore, will 
have an impact on its external sovereignty.  
Pooling and sharing: the new EU MS 
sovereignty enhancer? 
Several authors have extensively discussed pooling and 
sharing, while analysing its impact on the concept of 
sovereignty. The first question one must immediately 
ask is if sovereignty can be pooled. Jackson argues that 
sovereignty can - in fact - be shared, presenting the 
case of the European Union. However, this exchange 
occurs without  actual loss of states’ territorial 
sovereignty, where they are ultimately responsible for 
matters of security and defence [6, p. 8-9]. Philpott also 
agrees with this approach. For him, the creation of the 
EU represents the first occurrence of a significant 
amount of transfer of political authority from States 
toward a non-state entity. Thus, the EU does not 
replace MS sovereignty which still rely on the state 
entity, while receiving the authority provided by the 
portion of each MS sovereignty [7, p. 39]. 
Of course, States do not intend to make this transfer 
just to have a lower threshold for intervention. States, 
which consist of people, deliberate on these issues - in 
theory - in a rational way. Then, one can ask why 
States carry out such transfer. Ginsberg, who argues for 
the principle of “Politics of Scale”, provides the answer 
to this question. MS realize they have a bigger weight 
in the international arena acting together as a block, 
than if they acted alone. In fact, the author argues that 
the result of this action is even bigger than the 
arithmetic sum of each states’ capabilities put together, 
leading joint operations at a lower cost and with fewer 
risk [10, p. 27]. 
This principle is also applicable to capability 
development, the external guarantor of independence, 
which is an unquestionable mark of sovereignty. So the 
first observation we would like to make is that pooling 
and sharing do not diminish but rather increase state’s 
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sovereignty. As we have seen, many EU MS do not 
have the ability to - autonomously - undertake an 
operation to defend their interests. Therefore, the 
Sovereignty issue is already somewhat illusory. 
However, by pooling and sharing, EU MS may develop 
capabilities, increasing the efficiency of its defence 
budget. 
Looking at lessons from the past, we found that the EU 
was able to transform its weakness of not having a 
military structure to strengths by developing a series of 
civilian capabilities for crisis management, which can 
be seen essential in the world that emerged from the 
Cold War. Regarding this structural weakness, and 
among the most promising mechanisms introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty, we may highlight the Permanent 
Structured Cooperation, which may allow the further 
and faster development of EU capabilities [11, p. 
150-52]. This mechanism, in conjunction with the 
existing Battlegoups, will enable the EU to increase the 
number of units on standby. This increase - such as 
increasing participation in operations - will lead to 
increased costs. In order to deal with these costs, the 
Union must find a way for dedicating fundings for 
enabling MS to participate in operations and – at the 
same time – keep investing in the restructuring of its 
armed forces [12, p. 66]. This financial constraint, 
alongside with the current financial crisis, will 
constitute a leverage and further contribute to a greater 
pooling and sharing of military resources in Europe [13, 
p. 40].  
Some MS have already adopted this approach. On 
November 2, 2010, the United Kingdom and France 
signed a 50 years an agreement for the creation of a 
joint expeditionary force of 10,000, and sharing their 
aircraft carriers, and as for the unprecedented 
deepening of cooperation among nuclear submarines in 
both countries. In their joint statement at Lancaster 
House, British Prime Minister argued that this 
agreement would enable both countries to reduce 
defence spending, increasing their capacities [14]. The 
training has already started in 2011. We are aware that 
this is not an EU treaty, but a bilateral one. Still, it is 
setting an example.  
In an EU framework, this concept of pooling and 
sharing could be achieved with the integration of 
command and control and logistical support, keeping 
combat units purely national. With this approach, a 
significant slice of the costs would be reduced without 
losing the effectiveness of combat units, where is 
required a strong sense of unity, commitment and 
discipline. This pooling and sharing in operations could 
be gradually transferred to a more permanent structure 
in the EU [15, p. 198-99]. 
Regarding the EU structures, the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) is already developing this pooling and 
sharing concept through a variety of projects. The 
Agency launched a series of programs, which were 
prioritized through a connection made between the lack 
of current capabilities and future shortages. Among the 
various projects, we may highlight the project of the 
European helicopters fleet. Currently the EU has about 
1,700 helicopters, which are not available for crisis 
management missions mainly due to two reasons: (i) 
the preparation of the crews, who are not trained to 
operate in demanding environments such as deserts and 
extremely mountainous terrain ; and (ii) the fact that 
some helicopters are not technologically prepared to fly 
in these environments.  
The Agency has developed programs to deal with both 
this issues, by providing, crew training. For this 
purpose, EDA started in 2010 the program "Helicopter 
Tactics Training Programme", which will train crews 
to fly in Europe most demanding operating 
environments. On the other hand, EDA is also 
developing a program of updating existing aircraft - 
through simple technological solutions - in order to 
operate in theatres where European forces are being 
employed today. As for future developments, EDA is 
starting a Helicopter Transport of the Future program, 
initiated by France and Germany, and currently open to 
participation of other MS. This helicopter is not 
expected to be operational before 2020. 
Regarding air transport, twelve European countries, 
including Portugal, have already agreed on the creation 
of a European Air Transport Fleet (EATF), which 
operate the current C130 and the new A400M. This 
fleet will carry out different types of pooling and 
sharing, providing, flight aircraft hours, joint training, 
logistics and maintenance, and is expected to become 
operational between 2014 and 2017. This same concept 
of pooling and sharing is being used in the 
establishment of a multinational unit for the new 
A400M, which will be a part of the EATF. 
In the naval dimension, EU is also developing some 
new projects, including the replacement of the existing 
anti-shipping mines, between 2018 and 2020, as well as 
the development of a UAV capable of being launched 
and land from and on a deck of a ship, thereby 
increasing the ability to be used at sea. Also in the 
UAV department, EDA is developing technologies that 
will allow the UAV flight in European airspace, 
including the integration of sense and avoid technology. 
Finally, and in space, we should also mention MUSIS 
project, which allow - through the use of a dual-use 
technology, military and civilian - the monitoring and 
surveillance of the globe, and is expecting to be 
operational by 2015 [16, p. 167-69]. These initiatives 
are synchronized with the development of the 
interoperability of the Battlegroup concept, and an 
aircraft carriers fleet [17, p. 149-50]. in particular, for 
the Battlegroup concept, is noted for some time the 
need to include air and sea components, allowing naval 
support, close air support and air interdiction, essential 
to any military intervention. For that purpose, joint 
training is currently a priority [18, p. 62]. 
Regarding joint training, Pöttering suggests a 
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completely new approach, arguing for a Synchronized 
Armed Forces Europe (SAFE). His model of 
integration emphasizes the need for standardization of 
procedures and rules of engagement. He argues that EU 
armed forces should perform joint and combined 
training. According to Pöttering, joint training would 
increase the level of trust and interdependence. He also 
argues that it is necessary to eliminate differences - in 
terms of medical and social support for the military and 
their families in case of death or disability - between 
soldiers of different nationalities integrated in EU 
operations. To this aim, he proposes to create a "Statute 
of the European military in joint operations". 
Pöttering's ideas are innovative and go even further. 
According to the author, military careers should be 
open to any national of any EU MS, and the only 
criteria should be the mastering of an operational 
language. Following his idea would again be possible 
to see a Dutchman to fly a fighter of the Royal Air 
Force. Looking like a futuristic vision of Europe, one 
should remember that this was the case during World 
War II. A more recent example of this idea is provided 
by Belgium. Currently any EU  citizen can apply and 
serve in the Belgian Armed Forces. 
This approach can be supported through the European 
Initiative for the exchange of young officers, inspired 
by Erasmus, known as the “Military Erasmus” [19], 
which should be extended to all ranks and grades, 
promoting cross-training module. Any military 
designed for international operations must have a clear 
idea of the European institutions and their mode of 
operation [20, p. 37-39].  
Conclusions 
Through this paper we presented an innovative 
approach to the concept of sovereignty in the European 
context. To this end, we began our work by analysing 
the concept of sovereignty, noting the existence of two 
conditions, (i) the supremacy at home, and (ii) 
independence externally. As such, this concept only 
makes sense if seen in the light of a society of equal 
entities, which together represent and recognize the 
existence of independence. However, for the 
declaration to be effective, it is necessary that each 
entity have the sufficient means (power). The absence 
of this power, and the inability of its projection, will 
lead to the existence of an illusory view of sovereignty.  
We also found that - despite being in a world where the 
traditional logic of power changed - the EU still 
coexists with the modern world and pre-modern, thus 
necessitating a means for power projection. Noting the 
need for mechanisms of power in the external order, we 
then checked whether EU MS held this capability 
independently. From the analysis we found significant 
limitations to the projection of force, regarding the 
intensity and duration of operation. However, this lack 
of capacity could be justified by the absence of real 
threat, which could be built when needed. However, we 
found that there is a clear trend of an aging European 
population, which will bring greater pressure on health 
expenditure and social security. Concurrently, we argue 
that it’s not expected a strong economic growth in the 
EU, which could accommodate an increase in spending 
and on health and education simultaneously. In fact, the 
current scenario is actually the reverse. The current 
deficit crisis, associated with the containment measures 
announced by several countries, come to show us that 
(i) is not expected strong economic growth, the fruit of 
their own austerity measures and (ii) expenditure with 
defence will actually be reduced. Thus, we find that 
there is no room to develop means of force projection, 
independently, by EU MS. 
Naturally, EU MS have long observed this reality, 
which is why they started a movement that set the 
politics of scale, i.e. to find a form of association where 
the sum of all is greater than the sum of each individual. 
One must remember that European states still represent 
a significant share of world defence spending. However, 
it is through the process of pooling and sharing, that 
states want to be more effective regarding the spending 
on defence, and gave several examples of current 
processes and future possibilities of deepening this 
movement. An example of practical and pragmatic is 
the Franco-British line of defence signed in November 
2010, where countries wish to share resources, 
achieving a reduction in spending and - simultaneously 
- an increase in capacity. We recall that it was the 
Paris – London duet, from St-Malo, that gave birth to 
the European Security and Defence Policy.  
Now we will test our argument. During this work we 
found that pooling and sharing will increase the 
sovereignty of European states, since it will allow a 
greater ability to project power, which is essential to 
support the external dimension of sovereignty. Thus, 
through a process of pooling and sharing, European 
states can defend their interests on a global scale, a 
level they will be denied if they choose to pursue 
policies and logical individual power. 
Finally, we would also argue that the current financial 
crisis can serve as a catalyst for further development of 
these mechanisms. Given the need for financial 
restraint, governments may come to deepen a process 
of pooling and sharing resources - even reducing costs 
- and increasing its effectiveness. This is the logic of 
the Franco-British agreement. For those who do not 
agree with our argument, we leave some open 
questions. Does any EU MS has power - today - to act 
independently? Can any EU MS control the entire 
territory, not only continental, but also at sea? Can this 
be expected in the near future? Can the EU act as 
enhancer of sovereignty? What is the best option: 
maintain the status quo with the current illusion of 
sovereignty, or invest in a deepening of European 
defence?  
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